You just got your head around PSR. Three-year rolling losses, the June 30 deadline, the point deductions, the creative accounting gymnastics. All of it. And now the Premier League has binned the whole thing.
From the 2026-27 season, Profit and Sustainability Rules are gone. In comes the Squad Cost Ratio (SCR) and Sustainability and Systemic Resilience (SSR) — a completely new financial framework that’s more immediate, more focused on on-pitch spending, more transparent, and for some clubs, considerably more dangerous than anything that came before for clubs living beyond their current revenue means.
The big shift: PSR asked whether you’d lost too much money over three years. SCR asks a much simpler and harder question — are your on-pitch costs (player and coach wages, transfer amortisation, and agent fees) more than 85% of what you earn from football right now? No more hiding losses in three-year averages. No more selling hotels and women’s teams to paper over the cracks and balance the books. Monitoring happens in real time (with shadow monitoring already in 2025/26), and breaches can bring quicker consequences. Real-time compliance. Real-time consequences.
Clubs get a multi-year 30% overspend allowance (pushing toward ~115% before levies or sanctions). Once exhausted, they must stay at or below 85% or face sporting penalties. European clubs must also navigate UEFA’s stricter ~70% squad cost cap.
SSR adds three balance-sheet tests: minimum working capital (£12.5m cash/reserves), a liquidity stress test (ability to survive an £85m shock over two years), and positive equity (liabilities no more than 90% of assets in 2026/27, tightening to 80% by 2028/29). Fail these and transfers can be blocked even before an SCR breach.
This is your guide to where every Premier League club stands heading into the new era — who’s built for it, who’s scrambling, and who’s about to have a very uncomfortable summer.
How SCR Actually Works: The Short Version
Squad costs — wages, transfer amortisation, agent fees and manager costs — must not exceed 85% of football-related revenue. Clubs start with a 30% overspend buffer, meaning they can push to 115% of revenue before automatic points deductions kick in. But that buffer is a finite resource: overspend this year and it shrinks. Clubs are assessed every March and every October. No more waiting three years to find out you’ve gone too far.
The SSR adds three separate tests — working capital (£12.5m minimum cash reserves at all times), liquidity (surviving an £85m stress test over two years) and positive equity (liabilities no more than 90% of assets from 2026-27, tightening to 80% by 2028-29). Fail those and the League can block your transfers before you’ve even reached the SCR breach threshold.
One more thing worth underlining: clubs in European competition still face UEFA’s stricter 70% SCR cap. For the biggest clubs, complying with both simultaneously is the real tightrope act.
Right. Let’s go through every club.
🔴 The Red Zone: Structural Challenges Under SCR
Chelsea
Estimated 2025/26 revenue: £600m+ (with full Champions League and Club World Cup impact) | Recent wage bill (2024/25): ~£359m–£390m (UEFA/club figures vary) | Cumulative transfer spend on current squad: ~£1.5bn+ | Status: Highest-risk balance sheet in the league
There is no other way to say this: Chelsea are in a financial situation that has no precedent in English football. Chelsea recorded the largest pre-tax loss in English football history in 2024/25: £262.4m (club accounts) or up to £355m per UEFA data. Revenue reached ~£491m–£511m, but operating costs and high amortisation from massive past spending drove the deficit.
And yet — here’s the twist — Chelsea are forecasting record revenues of over £700m for 2025-26, driven by Champions League return, Club World Cup prize money recognition and a finally secured front-of-shirt sponsor. If those revenues land and the wage bill holds steady at around £167m, the SCR ratio actually looks manageable in isolation.
The squad’s cumulative transfer cost exceeds £1.5bn — the most expensive in world football. The problem is the 30-year player contracts and astronomical amortisation costs sitting on top of those wages. Long contracts were a PSR workaround to spread amortisation, but under SCR they lock in high annual squad costs for years. Even with rising revenue from European football and sponsorships, the amortisation burden makes compliance tight. Chelsea will need strong player sales and revenue growth to avoid burning through their buffer quickly. This remains the most complex financial situation in the Premier League.
Chelsea are the club most likely to need to prove their buffer hasn’t already been exhausted before the season even starts. Watch this space very closely.
Aston Villa
2024/25 revenue: ~£378m | Wage bill: significantly up (previously ~£250m range, now higher with Champions League) | Status: Still volatile, Europe-dependent
Villa avoided a PSR breach in 2024-25 through a combination of Champions League income, player sales and genuine wage bill restraint — down from the £252m peak of 2023-24. But the pattern at Villa is consistent: spend big, scramble to comply, spend big again. Under SCR, that cycle becomes harder to sustain because there are no three-year averaging tricks left to play.
Villa’s revenue surged with Champions League participation, but wage costs rose sharply too. Their historical wage-to-revenue ratio has hovered high (around 70%+ in some reports), and UEFA has previously required spending plan discussions. Under SCR, sustained European qualification is crucial — dropping out would squeeze the ratio fast and test SSR liquidity. The old “spend big, sell to comply” cycle is riskier now.
Champions League money helps. Losing it hurts. Villa’s SCR compliance is entirely dependent on where they finish in the league every season — which is exactly the volatility the SSR liquidity test is designed to stress-test. If Villa drop out of Europe next season, they’ll be making phone calls to agents on the sell side by January.
Manchester United
2024/25 revenue: ~£666m–£793m (Deloitte range) | Wage bill trending down but still high (~£300m+ range previously) | Status: Restructuring in progress, needs UCL revenue
Under Ratcliffe, United’s financial restructuring has been real and genuinely painful — hundreds of redundancies, player sales, a deliberately lean approach to transfers. The wage bill is coming down, dropping roughly 9% per quarter in recent periods. The restructuring programme is expected to deliver £40-45m in annual savings when fully implemented.
Ratcliffe-era cost-cutting (redundancies, player sales) has helped, with quarterly wage reductions reported. But there’s a catch: United’s revenue is also falling, missing Champions League football hit broadcast income. No Champions League means broadcast income is down significantly. Commercial revenue has dipped. And the wage contracts signed under the previous regime — some of the most expensive in Premier League history — don’t disappear overnight. Under SCR, the ratio that matters is squad costs as a percentage of current revenue, and United’s revenue base has shrunk at precisely the moment the new rules demand discipline.
Europa League and FA Cup income helps. Champions League qualification next season — which Bruno Fernandes’ form this year makes more plausible — would transform the picture. But the transition window between now and SCR taking full effect in 2026-27 is genuinely tight for Old Trafford. Ratcliffe’s people know it. That’s why the sales have been so aggressive.
Revenue remains strong commercially, but expensive legacy contracts weigh on the ratio. Qualification for Europe next season would ease pressure significantly. The transition to full SCR compliance is tight.
Everton
Recent revenue: ~£197m–£210m | Wage bill: reduced but still substantial (previously higher peaks) | Status: Stabilising with new stadium, but debt-sensitive
Two points deductions under PSR. A new stadium finally opening at Bramley-Moore Dock. A wage bill that has been dramatically streamlined as the club has desperately shed expensive contracts. Everton under PSR were a cautionary tale. Under SCR, the question is whether the new stadium revenue materialises fast enough to give them a healthy ratio.
Wage restraint and player sales helped under PSR (including point deductions). The Bramley-Moore Dock stadium should boost matchday and hospitality revenue long-term. SSR equity and liquidity tests will be key given stadium-related debt. If new income materialises quickly, SCR looks more manageable — but the club remains structurally cautious.
The good news: new stadium, new naming rights deal, premium hospitality and improved matchday revenue should push their income upward significantly. The bad news: they’re building a competitive squad on a tight budget while the league around them gets richer. Their SCR ratio will be manageable if the stadium income lands — but the SSR equity test, given the debt associated with the stadium build, is a more interesting question that deserves independent scrutiny. This story isn’t over.
Nottingham Forest
Recent revenue: ~£165m–£200m range | Wage bill: elevated for a promoted club | Status: Improved but fragile
Forest’s response to their PSR point deduction was dramatic and fast over £100m in player sale profits in a single window, genuine discipline on incoming transfers, and a run of form that has kept them in European competition and generated prize money that genuinely helps. These Big player sales helped post-PSR deduction, but long contracts and premium wages built for higher expectations remain. A poor season or early European exit could expose the structure under real-time SCR monitoring.
But the underlying challenge hasn’t gone away. Forest are a promoted club that spent like a Champions League participant. Their squad cost commitments — long contracts, premium wages — were built for a PSR environment that no longer exists. Under SCR’s real-time assessment, a bad season with Europa League elimination in the group stages would expose that structure very quickly. They’re not back in the danger zone. But they’re one rough season from revisiting it. Discipline in the next windows will be essential.
🟡 The Amber Zone: Watching Carefully
Newcastle United
2024/25 revenue: ~£335m (club record) | Wage bill: ~£243m | Status: Disciplined but revenue-limited
Newcastle’s entire transfer strategy for the past two seasons has been a masterclass in SCR preparation before SCR existed. Smart sales, disciplined wages, no panic buys. The restraint has been frustrating for fans but financially it makes them one of the better-positioned mid-tier clubs entering the new era. Saudi ownership means equity isn’t a concern. The challenge is revenue their football-related income is still significantly below the clubs they’re competing with for Champions League places, which limits how much their 85% threshold actually is in pound terms. Champions League football would transform their SCR headroom immediately. They know this. It’s why the league push is as much financial as sporting.
Smart sales and wage control have positioned them well for SCR. Saudi-backed equity helps SSR tests. The main constraint is football revenue relative to top clubs — Champions League qualification would dramatically increase headroom.
Burnley
Estimated revenue: £120m (Championship) | Wage bill: £58m | Status: Relegated, SCR clock reset, opportunity knocking
Burnley are going down — one win in 22 games tells you all you need to know. But from a purely financial perspective, relegation and SCR together could actually work in their favour. The SCR ratio is calculated on current revenue, and Championship income is lower — but so are the squad costs they’re required to maintain. Parachute payments help bridge the gap. Their wage bill will need to come down but they have a full window to manage it. The clubs that survive relegation financially under SCR are the ones who move quickly on contracts, and Burnley have had enough PSR scrapes to know how to read the room.
Leeds United
Estimated revenue: £210m | Wage bill: estimate £80m+ | Status: Promoted, but SCR applies from day one
Leeds are back in the Premier League and the SCR rules apply to promoted clubs without the leniency that PSR offered. Their EFL-era player sales — Rutter, Summerville, Kamara — gave them headroom under the old system. Under SCR, their ratio will be determined by Premier League revenue (broadcast, commercial, matchday) against squad costs that include every long-term contract on the books. The indicative data based on 2023-24 figures showed Leeds among the clubs with the highest estimated SCR ratios — meaning they’re already spending a high proportion of income on squad costs. Their summer window will need to be disciplined. No panic buys, targeted sales where necessary. They know the drill.
West Ham, Crystal Palace, Wolverhampton Wanderers
These mid-table clubs show varied pictures: West Ham benefited from past big sales (e.g., Declan Rice) but needs consistent performance for revenue stability. Smaller clubs like these and Wolves have improved via smart sales and wage control. Palace appear quietly disciplined. All must maintain proportionality — one bad window or dip in results can shift them toward amber/red under SCR.
Promoted sides (e.g., Leeds, Sunderland, Burnley if relevant) face immediate SCR application with no special leniency, though parachute payments and EFL-era sales can provide short-term buffer. Disciplined summer windows are critical.
🟢 The Green Zone: Well Positioned for the New Era
Manchester City
Recent revenue: ~£715m–£829m range (consistently elite) | Wage bill: highest in division (~£400m+ staff costs in peaks) | Status: Domestically SCR-proof
City’s commercial income is in a different stratosphere to most other English clubs. £715m in total revenue — a Premier League record. Even at £230m in wages (the highest in the division), their SCR ratio sits comfortably below the 85% green threshold once transfer amortisation is factored in properly. They’ve recorded profit in every season since 2014-15 except the Covid year. Under SCR they are genuinely untouchable from a domestic compliance perspective. The only regulatory threat to City now is UEFA — and those 115 charges that seem to be taking approximately one geological era to conclude. We haven’t forgotten.
City’s commercial power and revenue base give enormous headroom. They’ve been profitable in most recent seasons (Covid aside). SCR rewards their model; the main external risk remains unresolved regulatory matters.
Arsenal
2024/25 revenue: ~£691m | Wage bill: controlled (~£347m–£413m range per reports) | Status: The model club
Arsenal spent years being the club everyone cited as well-run but boring. Now they’re title contenders and their finances are the envy of the league. A record £617m in revenue, a modest pre-tax loss of just £17.7m in their most recent accounts, and a squad built through smart recruitment rather than panic buying. Their SCR ratio is one of the best in the division — high revenue, controlled wages, and a Champions League run that’s adding serious prize money on top. If Arsenal win the league this season, the revenue bump from increased commercial deals and the general profile boost makes their position even stronger. Arteta’s tactical evolution and the financial prudence aren’t separate stories. They’re the same story.
Record revenues, smart recruitment, and a low wage-to-revenue ratio (~50% in strong years) make them ideally suited for SCR. Near break-even results and Champions League consistency strengthen their position further.
Liverpool
2024/25 revenue: ~£703m (club record) | Wage bill: ~£428m | Status: Strong base, but big spending adds future amortisation
Liverpool returned to profit in 2024-25 — £15.2m after tax — driven by record revenue of £703m including Premier League title prize money, Champions League returns and a bumper commercial year. Their SCR ratio is healthy. The concern is forward-looking: the £450m summer spent on Isak, Wirtz, Ekitike, Kerkez and Frimpong represents one of the most ambitious recruitment drives in Premier League history, and the amortisation of those fees will start appearing in next season’s squad cost calculation. Liverpool’s revenue base is large enough to absorb it — but the ratio will tighten, and they’ll need to stay in Champions League football for the sums to keep working. Miss out on Europe and the maths changes dramatically.
Back in profit (£15.2m after tax) thanks to title success, UCL, and commercial growth. The revenue base can absorb significant investment, but heavy summer spending will increase amortisation in future squad cost calculations. Staying in Europe is vital for the maths to work.
Tottenham
2024/25 revenue: ~£565m | Wage bill: ~£256m | Status: Revenue-strong, on-pitch challenges separate
Spurs are in a relegation battle this season with the seventh-highest wage bill in the league. From an SCR perspective this is almost irrelevant — their stadium depreciation inflates the allowable deductions under the new system just as it did under the old one, their revenue base is enormous, and the Levy machine generates commercial income that most clubs can only dream about. From a football perspective, spending £101m on wages and sitting in the bottom three is a different kind of crisis. Their SCR ratio will be fine. Their manager’s job status is a separate matter entirely.
Stadium-driven commercial and matchday income provides a solid SCR foundation (helped by depreciation allowances). High revenue gives flexibility despite footballing inconsistency.
Bournemouth
Revenue: £230m | Wage bill: £58m | Status: Stabilising well, smart sales did the work
Bournemouth are one of six clubs projected to post a profit in 2024-25, largely off the back of smart player sales including Dean Huijsen to Real Madrid. Their SCR ratio has improved significantly over the past two seasons. The concern historically was that their revenue base is one of the smaller in the league — but the combination of rising prize money, sensible wages and continued player trading means they’re in decent shape heading into the new era. Not bulletproof, but not nervous either.
Fulham
Revenue: £250m | Wage bill: £63m | Status: Quietly solid
Fulham’s long-term owner Shahid Khan has run a disciplined financial operation despite the yo-yo Premier League/Championship history. The Craven Cottage redevelopment is pushing matchday revenue up year-on-year. Their wage bill is controlled, their transfer activity has been targeted rather than lavish, and under SCR their ratio looks clean. One of the clubs you’d expect to sail through the new system without drama.
Sunderland
Revenue: £150m (first Premier League season) | Wage bill: estimate £55m | Status: Fresh books, real opportunity
Sunderland come up with tidy Championship finances, a fanbase that generates exceptional matchday income for their level, and none of the historical baggage that has haunted clubs like Everton and Forest. Their SCR ratio in year one will be determined by how quickly Premier League broadcast money arrives versus how quickly they’ve grown the wage bill in anticipation. Promoted clubs get some SSR leeway in the equity test — the SCR itself applies from day one. Smart recruitment this summer is everything for them.
Brighton
Revenue: £330m | Wage bill: £72m | Status: The gold standard of Premier League financial management
Brighton made £208m in profit over the past two years. Let that sink in. Their SCR ratio is among the lowest in the division — spending a very small percentage of their income on squad costs — and their model of developing talent and selling at profit makes them perfectly suited to the new era. SCR rewards exactly what Brighton do: generate revenue proportionate to spending, sell intelligently, reinvest wisely. Tony Bloom built a club for this moment before this moment existed. They have the most financial flexibility in the league, full stop.
Brentford
Revenue: £200m | Wage bill: £51m | Status: Leanest and smartest operator at their level
One of the best-run clubs in English football by almost any metric. Small wage bill, smart sales (Ivan Toney’s departure was textbook), improving prize money as they establish Premier League consistency. Their SCR ratio will be one of the cleanest in the division. Under a system that rewards proportionality, Brentford thrive. The challenge, as ever, is that their revenue ceiling is lower than the big clubs — which limits what 85% actually buys them in squad terms. They’ll continue doing more with less, which is what they’ve always done.
The Statr Verdict
PSR rewarded clubs who could play the accounting game. Sell a hotel. Sell a women’s team. Book a profit in year three after two years of losses. Lawyers and accountants were as valuable as scouts and managers.
SCR changes the game. It rewards clubs who generate football revenue proportionate to what they spend on football. That’s a simple principle and it has simple implications: clubs with massive commercial operations and global fanbases have the most headroom. Clubs with high wages relative to their income — regardless of clever accounting tricks — are exposed.
Chelsea are the most compelling case study of the new era. Record losses, a squad that costs more than anyone else’s, but a revenue trajectory that — if it materialises — could make the ratio work. If the revenues don’t land, the 30% buffer they’re likely relying on disappears faster than you can say “eight-year contract.” Many clubs will need disciplined summers: targeted sales, wage restraint, and intelligent recruitment. In the new era, financial prudence and sporting success are even more tightly linked. Understanding the money helps explain (and predict) the football.
At Stardraft, we’ll be tracking the summer window through both lenses — the tactical and the financial — because in 2026-27, you can’t understand one without the other.
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